Recursive programs and denotational semantics in absolute logics of programs  by Pasztor, Ana
Theoretical Computer Science 70 ( 1990) 127- 150 
North-Holland 
127 
Ana PASZTOR* 
Horida Istternationul IJniversity, School of Computer Science, Univeuity Park, Miami, FL 33199, 
USA 
Abstract. It has bee I proposed by Meyer, Kfouri and others to extend the so-called Nonstandard 
Logics of Programs approach (NLP henceforth) to recursive programs and denotational semantics 
in some natural way. The key step in doing NLP is selecting a semantics for programs (which, 
in the present paper, is denotational semantics) and then forming its KPU-absolute version. 
Absoluteness is a set theoretic property of logics. If a logic L is not absolute, then some formulas 
:jf L do not speak about the models of L, but about something else. If a logic has this strange 
property, then it is impossible to find a complete inference system for it, and this because of 
purely “administrative” reasons, which might not correspond to any of the inherent properties 
of the original situaticn we are modeling (in devising this logic etc.). This “administrative” 
incompleteness is only one of the undesirable side effects of nonabsoluteness. In NLP, the purpose 
of constructing and studying absolute versions of logics is aimed at, among other things, the 
removal of these undesirable properties. 
The absolute version of denotational semantics will turn out to be based on 2-sorted first order 
logic, or more concretely, on the usual nonstandard or weak second orJer logic. Some of the 
most relevant features of this logic are the ability to compare “reali&” existing program 
verification methods, create new, more powerful and still “realistic” ones, complete mess etc., to 
mention only ia very few. 
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For a formal treatment of recursive programs, denota 
have substantial adVantages over operational se 
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44,45,47,52,67-71,73,75-j arid many, many more). In this connection it has been 
proposed by Meyer [43], Kfouri and others to extend the so-called Nonstandard 
Logics of Programs approach (NLP henceforth and explained below) to recursive 
programs and denotational semantics in some natural way. 
The present paper esents a possibility to provide NLP with a denotational 
semantics which hand recursive programs. 
The key step in doing NLP is selecting a semantics (for programs) and then 
forming its KPU-absolute version (cf. below and [ 11,41,49,5 1,56,65]). In the 
present paper we will take denotational semantics as our starting point, and search 
for its KPU-absolute version along the ‘lines of the NLP traditions as outlined, for 
example in [8]. (KPU stands for Kripke-Platek axiomatization of set theory with 
urelements [ 111.) 
KPU-absoluteness (absoluteness henceforth) is a set theoretic property of logics 
[55,11]. Desirability of absoluteness was already pointed out in [55]. The definition 
of this property is somewhat technical, hence to illuminate what absoluteness means, 
we will rather try to indicate what the lack of this property means. If a logic L is 
not absolute, then some formulas of L do not speak about the models of L, but 
about something else. A typical example of this is the case of the higher order logic 
L2, described in 1561. Namely, there is a formula <p in L2, such that for any infinite 
model Ju of L2, we have M==cp iff CH (the continuum hypothesis) holds in the 
universe of set theory sometimes called the “real world” (in which J/J! and cp live). 
So we may fix Ju, fix q and add or remove a few sets from this universe of set 
theory such that the meaning of cp in & changes. It is important to note that the 
addition (or removal) of the new sets happens in such a way, that neither cp, nor 
M (nor their transitive hulls for that matter) are changed. In other words, no new 
set is an element of <p or JH, nor is it an element of their elements etc. Despite of 
all these precautions , Ai=cp holds before the addition (removal) of the new sets, 
and M=~(P after it. If a logic has this strange property, then it is impossible to find 
a complete inference system for it, and this because of purely “administrative” 
reasons, which might not correspond to any of the inherent properties of the original 
situation we are modeling (in devising this logic etc.). This “administrative” incom- 
pleteness is only one of the undesirable side effects of nonabsoluteness. In NLP, 
the purpose of constructing and studying absolute versions of logics is aimed at, 
among other things, the removal of these undesirable properties (in such a way 
however, that we are able to monitor and control the “‘price” we have to pay for 
this change). 
The semantics investigated in [8] was operational (no recursive programs were 
allowed there) and therefore its a&olute :ersion w?s based on a $sortec! first order 
logic. The absolute version of denotational semantics however, will turn out to be 
based on 2-sorted first order logic, or more concretely on the usual nonstandard 
or weak second order logic (see [39,40] fo rminology). (This version of second 
order logic is well known in the literature o ic, and its first tlmorou 
was probably given i is is VJ rs (e. ) ca Es a 
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second order logic.’ The point is that this enkin type second order logic is related 
to the classical, or “standard” second order logic exactly the same mqy E\ILP is 
related tu standard logics of programs.) 
Let us return to denotational semantics and the search for its absolute version. 
Let D be the set of possible states. Then, in denotational semantics, the meanings 
of (possibly nondeterministic) programs in D are binary relations R c k) x D over 
D. Therefore, it is natural to concentrate on D and on the relations over D. Here 
is what we mean. The NLP-method (originating with Henkin) for obtaining the 
absoiute version of a semantics “I=” consists of the following. First we look at some 
fixed definition of “I=“” For metamathematical reasons, this definition can be thought 
of as d set theoretical formula p. Then we investigate the essentially unbounded 
quantifiers occurring in p. For each of these quantifiers we investigate the kinds of 
mathematical objects (i .L elements of our set theoretic universe mentioned earlier) 
they range over. Then we add the set(s) of these objects to the models of our 
semantics “I=” as extra sorts. After this we change p accordingly, obtaining p’. As 
a rest+ all quantifiers in p’ are bounded. Then, by a result in [ 1 l], p’ is absolute. 
(The essence is, that everything formulas of the language speak about is now made 
explicit in the models, so that they really speak about the models, and not about 
something else.) The finishing touch is writing down axioms in the extended language 
of the new many-sorted semantics “Y9 to govern the behaviour of the extra sorts. 
(These axioms in the case of second order logic, for example, are usually the so-called 
comprehension axioms.) 
In denotational semantics, the meaning of a recursive program p in D is defined 
as the least fixed point o f a functional Fp from P( D x D) to P( 13 x D). The (set 
theoretic or metamathematical j formula cp defining the meaning R of p in D reads 
as 
and clearly contains one unbounded quantifier ranging over binary relations on D. 
As a consequence, we will add a new sort and we will use 2-sorted models (D, S, E ), 
where S is a set df binary relations on D and E is the usual membership relation. 
(On the other hand, we do not need objects of other than these sorts, unlike in e.g. 
[8], where three sorts are needed.) By writing down the comprehension axioms (to 
be able to make use of the new sort), we will arrive at weak (or nonstandard) second 
order logic, D being the first order sort, and S the second order sort (cf. [39, JO] 
for details). So we obtain second order logic as a natural “framework logic,” or 
“underlying logic” (in the sense of e.g. [58,62,65]) for a branch of NLP. 
Weak second order logic has already been used in NLP (as a framework logic) 
in, for example [39,40, 651 explicitly, and in [ 16, 17, 27, 37,38,63] implicitly. ore 
’ In pure proof theory, this is the only kind of second order logic (for certain rather na:urai reasons). 
Hence many proof theGrists do not use any of the adjectives “weak” or “nonstandard,” or ” 
discussed above. 
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detailed references in this connection can be found in [40]. other papers representing 
the NLP-approach are [ l-3,8,18-23,30,31,48-51,54,57-62,64]. 
We also would like to note that recursive programs have already been treated in 
the NLP-approach in, for example [14,151 and, to a certain extent in [25]. However, 
these treatments were not aimed at realizing all the main kinds of applications of 
NLP outlined in, for example [61,36,4%5 l]. 
To avoid misunderstandings, we would like to conclude this Introductio 
noting that the two terms “(KPU-) absolute logics of programs” and “nonstandard 
logics of programs ” are two different names for the same thing. The mathematical 
content of this statement consists of facts (1) and (2) below. 
(1) Every nonstandard logic of programs is KPU-absolute. 
(2) Given any logic of programs, if it is KPU-absolute, then, by the main results 
of [41] and [56], this logic shares those features of the existing NLPs which are 
considered important or relevant by the main proponents of NLP. (For example, 
the new logic might not be based on 3-sorted first order logic, but instead on 5-sorted 
or l-sorted or on some completely different kind of logic such as modal logic with 
Kripke models. It may not have an explicit time scale at all. These differences will 
not affect its belonging to NLP, since these features are considered to be irrelevant 
in NLP. Some relevant features would be the ability to compare “realistic” existing 
program verification methods, create new, more powerful and still “realistic” ones, 
completeness etc., to mention only a very few.) 
2. The framework logic F 
In this section we define the framework logic FL of our absolute logic IX”” of 
recursive programs. Technically, FL = ( FLd, : d is a l-sorted type) and FLd, is a 
classical, 2-sorted, first order language of type ds with the axioms of comprehension 
and extensionality as logical axioms. Every type ds is a 2-sorted expansion of the 
l-sorted type d (of data). So the models of FLd, are of the form (Q S, E), where 
p is a model of type d with universe D, S s P( D x D) (the powerset of D x D), 
and E is the “element of” relation ( c_ D x D x S), and furthermore these models 
satisfy the comprehension axioms. 
.I. efinition ( l-sorted type d9 model of type d). (i) A l-sorted similarity type (or 
signature-for short type henceforth) d is a pair (d,, d,) of functions, where the 
elements of the domain Do of d, are called function symbols of type d and for 
every fe DO, do(f) E w is called the arity ot’j’; similarly, the elements of the domain 
Q of d, are called relation symbols of type d, ard for every r E D, , d,(r) E: m - (0) 
is called the arity of 8= 
-sorted type d, a model Ip of type d is a pair (D, Do), D being a 
) and Do being a function: t 
assigns a function 
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(many-sorted type m, model of type m). (i) A many-sorted type pll is 
a triple (m,, #ml, m2), where mz is a set, whose elements are called sorts, and m, 
and m, are functions: the elements of the domain MO of m, are called function 
symbols and for every SE MO, m,(f) E rnf - {A} (i.e. is a nonempty, finite string of 
sorts) and is called the arity off; similarly, the elements of the domain A& of m, 
are called relation symbols, and for every r E A&, ml(r) E rnz -{A} and is called the 
arity of I= 
(ii) Given a many-sorted type m = (m,, ml, m2), a model of type m is a pair 
A = (A”, A’) of functions, where A0 assigns to every sort s E m2 a nonempty set 
A,, called the universe of sort s of A, and AI’ assigns to every function symbol f 
of arity sosl . . . s, a function f*” : A&,, x At5, x l l l x A&_, + As,,, and to every relation 
symbol Y of arity sos, . . . s, a relation r*li z I&, x A&, x l l l x A,,,. 
efinitim ( the type ds). Let d be an arbitrary l-sorted type as defined in 
Qefinition 2.1 (i). We expand d to a 2-sorted type ds in the following way. The set 
of sorts of ds is {& _s}; the function symbols of ds are those of type d, i.e. 
domain( ds,) = domain( and for every function symbol J if do(f) = n, then 
d&-J(f) = d”+r; the relation symbols of ds are those of d together with one additional 
symbol E of arity dds. In other words, domain(ds,) = domain v {E }, for every 
relation symbol r of d, if d,(r)=n( #O), then ds,(r)=d”, and ds,(E)=&. 
2.4. Notation ( dds, (0, S, E)). (i) Given any (l- or many-sorted) type t. we denote 
by Md, the class of all models of type t. 
(ii) Given a model A E Mdd,, we identify A with the triple (0, S, 6”) (or just 
(Q, S, E)), where Q 4 (A&, AX’ 1 (domain v domain(d, which is the “restric- 
tion” of JM to ahc type d and obviously is d model of type d, and S A A$ (which is 
the universe of sort s).~ 
efinition ( F,,, Fd, Lds). (i) Given a 1 -sorted type d, Fds denotes the set of all 
classical, first 0, der, 2-sorted formulas of type CEs with variables in X = (x,: n E w} 
(the set of variables of sort d), and in Y = (~7~: n E W} (the set of variables of sort 
_s). We assume that X and Y are disjoint. 
(ii) Fd denotes the set of all (classical) first order formulas of type d with variables 
in X. 
(iii) W e h ave now all ingredients together for the classical, &sorted language Ldp 
of type ds, namely Lds A ( Fd,S, Mdd,$, t=), where I= is the usual satisfaction relation. 
(For more on many-sorted first order logics see e.g. f&].) 
. For any model A = ( Q9 S, E‘{‘) E Mdti.$, any a, 9 a2 E D and any 6 E S9 
we will write (a,, a2) E.” 8 instead of (a,, a?, 6) E E .“. in for ulas we will re 
2 A denotes “equals by definition.“ 
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E (x, , x2, y) by (x, , x2) E y. (As indicated in Notation 2.4( ii), we will simply write 
E instead of E?) 
The language LJ, eLned above is not yet a language of our framework logic. 
What is missing is that for the models Ju of Lds, E J’ is not necessarily the true 
membership relation, moreover, we need the comprehension axioms to govern the 
behavior of the objects of the “new” sort s. So the final framework language FLd, 
of type d.s is going to be the restriction of L,, to models of the axiom of extensionality 
and scheme of comprehension. 
efinition (CoEx). (i) The following formula Ex (of type) ds is called axiom 
of extensionality: 
Ex A Vy,Vy,[y, = yz- Vx,Wx,( (x, , x,) cz y, f-) (x, , x2) E J-?)I. 
(ii) The following set Co of formulas (of type ds) is called the comprehension 
scheme (and sometimes first order comprehension with parameters (see e.g. [40]): 
Co~{~yvxVx’((x,x”)Ey++yJ(x,x’,x,,x~, . . .,xn,y1,y2,. . . ,y,n)): 
(iii) CoEx~Cou{Ex}. 
(iv) Given any type t and a set 7?z of formulas of type t, we denote by Mdt( 7%) 
the class of those models of type t, which satisfy (all formulas in) 7%. 
(v) Now we are ready to define our framework logic FL. In general, a logic L 
is a (meta)function L = (L,: t E T), where each L, is a langauge of type t and T is 
a class of types. 
2. efinition (FL, FL,,). Our framework logic FL 4 (Feds: d is a l-sorted type), 
and for each l-sorted type d, F&,, 4 ( Fds, Md& CoEx), I=) is the restriction of the 
classical, first order, 2-sorted language L ds to those models .lu which satisfy the 
axioms of comprehension and in which E *” is the true membership relation (between 
DxDand S). 
arks. (1) The models of our framework language FLJ,s of type ds are in fact 
s (D, S, E), where D is a model of type d, S E P( D x D) and E is the member- 
elation ( E D x D x S). 
(2) Concluding this section we would like to note once again (see 
that we arrived at weak second order logic as our framework logic (cf. [39,40] for 
more details and literature on weak second order logicj. 
In this section we 
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language of corresponding type with only assignments and while-loops (see Section 
4 for examples). Given a (recursive) program n and a model Ju = (Q S, E) we define 
the meaning &’ of IT in .& denotationally as the least fixed point of a function(a1) 
on S. Finally, we prove that x.” exists in S and is a function (on D). 
3. nition (the programming Zanguage Pti). Throughout this definition, let d be 
an arbitrary l-sorted type (cf. Definition 2.1(i)). Further, let P be a set whose 
elements we call program symbols and which are all different from the symbols 
of d. 
(i) or every program symbol p E P and variable x E X (of sort d), we define 
the l-sorted type dpk- as follows: (dpx), = 8, and 
(dpx), = d,u {(p. 1)) u {(if&) then else, 2): (+J = )cp(x) E Fd is quantifier free}, 
i.e. dpx has no relation symbols and in addition to the function symbols in d (whose 
arities remain unchanged), it has one unary function symbol p, and for every 
quantifier-free formula cp( = q(x)) of type d with no variable other than x occurring 
in it, the binary function symbol “ifq(x) then else.” 
(ii) We denote by Tm,, the set of all terms of type dpx (in the usual sense of 
logic [46, Definition 11 .l]). An example of such a term would be: ifq( x) then else 
(p(xA p( p(x,)), w h ere q is a quantifier-free formula of type d with all variables 
in x. We will return to the usual notation “ifq(x) then q else 7” instead of writing 
“if v(x) then else (7,) n).” 
(iii) We are now ready to define the programs of type c!. A string of symbols is 
a program of type d exactly if it is of the form p(x) := T(X), where 0 c B, x E X and 
T( = T(X)) c Tm,., is a term of type dpx with no variable other than x occurring in 
it. We denote by P,! the set of all programs of type d. 
A typical exarrple of a (type d and a) program in B,, is the following: 
p(x):= $f(x) thenf(x) else h(p(g,(x)), p(g,(x))), 
where Y is a una-y relation symbol, J g, and g, are unary function symbols, and h 
is a binary function symbol of type d. Theorem 4.6 of [42] proves that there is no 
flowchart (i.e. w hile-) program which is equivalent to this recursive program. 
ematks. (1) As defined above, our programming language has the flaw that it does 
not allow composition of programs. However, we happily accept this flaw as a price 
we pay for simplicity. Our aim in this version of the paper, is to concentrate on 
Fure recursive programs which are simple enough and yet strictly more powerful 
than while-programs. It is very easy to get rid of this flaw by allowing T(X) in the 
definition of p(x) := r(x) to contain symbols of programs which are different from 
p and whose definitions have already been completed. * this case a program like 
q(x) := p(r(x)) would also be legal, assuming, 
left-hand side of program definitions o 
(2) Our definition alllows only unary 
si licity. owever, in later versions we will t 
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program definition, which is of the form p(x,, . . . , x,,) = (p,(x, , . . . , x,~), . . . , 
Pnh 9 - - - T -%)), where PAX,, - ’ l , %I) = TAX,, l l -,x,1), ’ - * ,p,Ax,, * - ‘,.%A = 
7,,(x* 9 - - - 9 x,,), and each 7; may contain pl, . . . , p,,. Note that in this definition 
composition becomes legal. The transition from the unary to the n-ary case is in 
fact straightforward (see [40, p. 6, Remark (ii)]). 
Next, we would like to define the (denotational) semantics of our programming 
language(s) &. For this purpose, let the l-sorted type d be arbitrary, but fixed. 
efinition (semantics Of Pli ). Let p(x) := T(X) be a (recursive) program of type 
d as defined in Definition 3.1( iii) and let us denote it by 7r or n(x) to indicate that 
x is the only variable occurring in it. Further, let JZI = (Q, S, E) be a model of our 
framework language FL‘,\ (i.e. Q is a model of type d, S c P! D x r>)_ E is the 
membership relation between D x D and S, and & satisfies the comprehension 
axioms). We are going to define the meaning 7r ” of 7r in 4. 
(i) First, we define a function F7 : P( D x D) + P( D x D), uniquely determined 
by the right-hand side T( _Y) of z For every R E P( D x D), F,(R) k T.“( p/ R), where 
T.“( p/R) (read “the ,neaning of 7 in .& with p evaluated to R”) is a (binary) 
relation on D defined recursively as follows: let a, b E D be arbitrary: * 
(1) SupposethatT(x)=x.Then(a,b)&‘(p/R)iff a=b. 
(2) Suppose that T(X) # x and that for every subterm r’ of T, T’( p/R) has already 
been defined. 
(a) If 7(x) =f(7,(x), . . . , T,,(X)) for some function symbol .f of d of arity n, then 
(a, b) E 8’( p/ R) iff b =f,“( b, , . . . , b,,) for some b, , . . . , b,, E D such that (a, b;) E 
T;“(P/R) for i= 1,2,. , ., n. 
(b) Suppose T(X) = PIT’(X)). Then (a, b) E T I’( p/ R) iff there is an element CE D, 
such that (a, c) E T’.“( p/ R) and (c, b) E R. 
(c) Let T(X) = ifq$x) th en T,(X) else T?(X). Then, (a, b)E f”(p/R) iff (a, 5)~ 
$(p/ R) in case Al=q[a], and (a, b)E ~:(plR) otherwise. 
(ii) Finally, we are ready to define &I, namely 7~.” A= JLL.&, where p,F, denotes 
the least fixed point of F, in S (Le. a relation R E S, such that F,(R) = R and for 
any R’E S, if F,( R’) = R’, then R c R’). 
Of course, the first question one raises at this point is whether the above definition 
makes sense, i.e. 
Cl) Does psF, exist in S? 
(2) If it does, is it a (partial) function, as one would expect (since T(X) is 
deterministic)? 
The answers to these uestions are given in the following theorem. 
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roof. (I) First we will show that tx%F, exists. We define G = {R E S: F7( R) E R}. 
Then G f 8, since D x D E S, so D x D E G: let cy = true; then, since .&I= CO, 
.:zIl=3~VXV.X’( (X, X’) E .c’f) cu(X, X’)) 
which (together with M=Ex) proves D x DE S. Now let T&n G. We will prove 
that 7’~ S. For this, we need the following lemma. 
3. ma ( Ft is definable in F,,, ). The function F7 : P( D x D) + P( D x D), dqfinpd 
in DeJ6nition 3.2(i), is definable in F,,,, i.e. there is a formula yT( x, x’, y ) E F,,, , such 
that for ever-v R E S and a, b E D, A+ yJa, b, R] i# (a, b) E FT( R)( = /‘( p/R)). 
The proof goes by induction on the structure of T. 
(I) Assume r(s) = x. Then -y7(x, x’, _JJ) A (x = x’). 
(2) Assume T(X) f s and suppose that for every subterm T’ of s; the function FT., 
defined by the program p(x) := T’(X), is defined by the formula y+(x, x’, _v) E h;,, .
(a) If 7(-y) = f( 7-,(x)), . . . , . T,,(X) for some function symbol j’ of type d of arity 
PZ, tkrn 
yJx,x’,+3x ,... 3x,, 
( 
x’=f(_q: . . . . X,‘)r, i;, y&,x,,,) 
> 
. 
1-l 
(b) If T(X) = p( T’(X)), then Y~(_Tc, x’ ~7) A (3x,( yT& s1 , y) A (x, 7 x’) E y). 
:c) If rjx) = [j+(x) then q(x) else 7-&x), then 
%%(X)A 7%,(-Y -y’, Y)) v ( lcp(-X) A y&q x’, J’)). 
Now, using the recursive definition of r”( p/R) of Definition 3.2(i), it is easy to 
prove that for e-,.cry a, b E D and R E S, .ZIl= yJa, b, R] iff (a, b) E F,(R). C 
Continuing our proof of Theorem 3.3, more precisely of T = r) G E S, let 
P!_q _x’j A pd~~[V.u,\d.u,( yT(x,, -x2, J*) -+ (s,, x7) E 17) + (x, _u’) E Jy]. - . 
Since .,!4k= Co, .&=3_~‘VxV_~ ‘(/3(-q x’) - (x, x’) E y’), which means that there is an 
R E S, such that for all a, b E D, (a, b) E R iff for all R’E S with the property 
F,(R’)s R’, (o, bk R’. But then R=n G= T, SO TES. 
3.5. Claim. F_( r) = T, i.e. T is a jixed point of’ F_. 
roof of Claim 3. First we need the following lemma. 
3.6. Lemma. (F, is monotonic). 71re .function B;; is monotonic, i.e. *for ever:\’ 
R’s DX D, ifR~ R’, then F,(R)s F,(R’). 
roof of o By induction on the structure of r, rt is <ti,+ tu prove T “( JI/ 
r “(p/R’) whenever R c_ R’ (cf. Definition 3.2(i)). 0 
Using this Lem a 3.6, we can now see t 
sqsince T-==nG,(*)F,(T)c T. 
i.e. Tr F-J 
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As an easy consequence of Claim 3.5, we can see that T is the least fixed point 
of FT in S, i.e. T = psFr: let R E S be a fixed point of F,, i.e. F,(R) = R. Then R E G, 
so T E R. This completes the proof of th; existence of P.$‘~ (= w”). 
(II) We will now prove that p,F, = T is a function. For this let g be the re&ction 
of T to those elemen s of its domain, on which it behaves like a function, i.e. 
g L ((a, b) E T: b = b’ whenever (a, b’) E T}. 
3.7. Claim. F,(g) E g, i.e. for every a, b E D, if (a, b) E F,(g), then (a, b) E 
F,( T)( = T), and whenever (a, b’) E F,( T) for some b’E D, then h = b’. 
roof of Claim 3.7. By induction on the structure of r. Let a, b E D be arbitrary and 
assume that (a, b) E F,(g). 
(1) Assume +X)=X. Then (a, b)E F,(g) iff Q = b iff (a, b)E F,(T). 
(2) Assume that r(x) P x and that for every subterm 7’ of T, (a, b) E FTr( g) implies 
(a, b) E F+( T) and whenever (a, b’) E FJ T) for some b’E D, then b = b’. 
(a) Let 7(x) =f(r,(x), e . . , T,,(X)) for some function symbol f of type d of arity 
n. ‘Then (a, b) e F,(g) iff there are b,, . . . , b, E D, such that b =f “( b, , . . . , b,,) and 
forall i=l,..., n, (a, b;) E F7,(g). Then by induction hypothesis, (a, bi) E F,( T) for 
all i=l,. . . . , n, and so (a, b) E F,( T). Suppose now that (a, b’) E F,(T) for some 
b’c D. Then there are bi , . . . 9 b:, E D, such that for all i = 1,. . . , n, (a, 61) F FJ T) 
and b’=f’” (bi, . . . , hi,). But by the induction hypothesis bf = bi for all i = 1, - . . , n. 
and therefore b = b’. 
(b) Suppose r(x) = y( r’(x)). Then (a, b) E F,(g) iff there is a b, E D such that 
(a, b,) E FJ g) and b = g( 6,) (i.e. (b, , b) E g). By induction hypothesis then (a, b,) E 
F,,( T) and since g c T, (h, , b) E T. So (a, b) E F+( T). Assume now that (a, b’) E F,( T) 
for some b’E D. Then there is a b, E D such that (a, b,) E FTv( r) and (b, f b’) E T. By 
induction hypothesis b2 = b, and by the definition of g, since b, E domain(g), b’ = b. 
(c) Finally, assume r(x) = if q(x) then 7, (x) else am. Yhen (CL, b) E F,(g) iff 
(a, b)E F7,(g) in case M=<p[a], and (a, b) E F,,(g) otherwise. By the induction 
hypothesis then (a, b) E F,!( T) in case JO=cp[a],-and (a, b) E F,,( T) otherwise, i.e. 
(a, b) E F,( T). Assume now that (a, b’) E F,( T) for some b’ E D. Then (a, b’) E FJ T) 
in case .kl=p[a], in which case b= b’ by induction hypothesis, and (a, b’) e F,,( T) 
otherwise, in which case again b = b’, by induction hypothesis. 0 
roof of heorem 3.3 (condusion). Notice that g E S: let <F(x, x’, T) A 
[(x, x’) E T r\ Vx”( (x, x”) E T -x’ = x”)]; then, by AU= Co, there is an R E S such that 
for any a, b E D, (a, b) E R iff &l=cp[a, b, T]; obviously R = g. Claim 3.7, i.e. F,(g) c 
g, then implies that g E G, which then implies T E : But g c T by the definition of 
g, so T = g. This proves that T is indeed a function. 0 
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F, (defined by FJR) = /‘(p/R) for every R c D x D). We have then proved that 
this definition makes sense. 
Ies 
To gain insight into the meaning of recursive programs in (nonstandard) models 
J84 -(Q9 s, E)E ,J Co&), we will look at three examples. 
First example _ 
The type d of this example has a unary operation symbol pred (for predecessor), 
a constant symbol 10 dnd a binary relation symbol <. D1 denotes the model of type 
d whose universe is w (the set of all natural numbers) augmented by a simple 
Z-chain (2;: i E Z}, with the symbols pred, 10 and < given their obvious meanings 
(for all i,j~ 2, pred”l(z;) = zi_ 1, Z, < pi Zi iff i <j and for all n E o, n < z;). 
Now let us define the following recursive program v,: p(x) := if x > 10 then 
p( pred(x)) else x. If we denote the right-hand side by 7, then the meaning of 7rI in 
any model JZ = (0, , S, E) of FLd,T is given by the least fixed point of Ft in S. But 
first, let us examine the fixed points of F, in P( D, x 0,). It is easy to check that 
F,( R,s,) = R,, for R,, 2 {(n, n): n c lo} u {(m, 10):m E W, m > lo}, which is the usual, 
standard meaning of 7~~ in Q, . But for every element a E D, , the function R, A R,, u 
{(Zi, a): i E 2) is also a fixed point of F7, moreover, one can easily show that these 
are all the fixed points of F, which are functions. Of special interest is Rio, which 
is the only functional fixed point of F, definable in F‘, (by the formula ((x < 10 v x = 
10) A x = x’) v (x’ = 10 A s > 10)). As a consequence, since HI=Co, loo S, fro matter 
what S exactly is. (R,,, is the least definable fixed point of F, in the sense of [la).) 
Although we knc w very little about S c P( D, x D,), wc can nevertheless conclude, 
due to MI=Co, that the meaning of nl in JH is either Rio, if S contains none of the 
other fixed points R,, or otherwise R,s, (the standard meaning of 7~~ in
for any two fixsd points, their intersection is R,, and has to be in S (because of 
&=Co) (see Fi;g. 1). 
Second example 
The type d of this example consists of countably many constant symbols a,, 
(n E w), the unary function symbols J g, and g,, a binary function symbol h and a 
binary relation symbol r. We denote by 7~ the program 
p(x) := ifr(x) then f(x) ehe h(p(g,W), p(gdx))). 
Unlike 7pl, this program is not equivalent to any 
Fig. 2, IQ is going to be 
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n 
S 
Fig. 1. 
for example in a:? (which we may denote by a,,) or h ‘2 (which we may denote by 
/I), and also parentheses like, for example in g,(g,(gr( a,,))) (which we may denote 
by g,g,g,(a,,)). The model Dz of type d is the absolutely free (or Herbrand) algebra 
of the type d but without the function symbol h, generated by the constants a,, 
(n E w) and an extra element bo; in addition to this, hLJ)z( a, a’) = 15, for any a, ak D1 
and the relation rI-)z consists exactly of the elements of the form G, G2. . .G,( a,,), 
where n E o and for each i, Gj is either g, or g, (e.g. g,gzg,( a,), gig, (a?) E r”:). Let 
us denote the right-hand side of IQ again by r and let JZI = (Qz, S, E) be an arbitrary 
model in FL,,,. Again, we will look at those fixed points of F, in P( D3 x 0) which 
are functions. The first one, which we denote again by I?,,, is the usual, standard 
meaning of 7rr:! in @I, namely 
R,, = {( 6, . . . G,, (a,, ), M: k < n, n E 0, each Gj E 18, , g8 
u{(G,. . . ,,(a,,),S(GI . . . G,@,))): n E w, each G; E {P,, &I. 
Other fixed points R consist of the elements of I<,, and some other pairs (a, h,,), 
.Jvhet-e i c J’? ti~r JE:,Y<&,). Notice that once R is defined on an element a c domain( R,s,), 
=Y is defined on the whole tree . 3, since F,(.ri)(a) = h(Rg,a, Rg,a) etc. As in 
the previous example, o 
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is of special InrcLI l -•*c\st, being definable in F(, and therefore being an element of any 
S whatsoever (since ~62~ CO). U containing all other (functional) fixed points of FT 
in P(D2 x Dz), abl we can say is that &, i.e. the least fixed point of El in S, is 
either U, if S contains none of the other fixed points R mentioned above, or one 
of the other fixed points R (like e.g. R,, u ((G, G2 . . . G&a, ), bo): k E o, each 
G E (819 8211), izr which case it is the intersection of all the fixed points of FT in S. 
This is :rot necessarily R,, (Fig. 4). 
7% ird example 
The type d of this example is the same as in the second example and 7~ denotes 
the program 7;r2 of the second example. We will give a stepwise description of the 
model Q3 of type d (Fig. 5). First we take a partial algebra (i.e. the operations 
may not be defined everywhere) consisting of the consta 
whose root we d note by b,, and 
two sons b,,,(, an b,,,, (m E o*), 
is the free completion of type d of auk5 
consists of exact 
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whose standard meaning in Ql is the same as the standard meaning of 3 in Q3 (cf. 
2, proof of Theorem 4.63). Let .I#!= (D, , S, E) be an arbitrary model in FLd,. 
Before discussing the meaning of rr in Ad: we will look again at the fixed points of 
P( D3 x D3) (7 denoting the right-hand side of 7~). 
e standard meaning of n in &, which we denote again by R,$,, is 
FT has also (uncountably many) fixed points R which contain R,, and assign to 
some elements a B domain( R,, ) elements b,, E R in a precisely prescribed fashion: 
(g,a) = t~,,,~, and (g,a) = b,,,, because 
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This example differs from the two earlier examples in many respects. If we denote 
by So the set of binary relations on H), which are (first order) definable in 
F, has no fixed point at all in So. We will next assume that S (of our model .d) is 
the “closure of S,, under comprehension,” denoted by SO. First we form S, , the set 
of all relations, which are (first order) definable in ( &, So, E). Then e.g. F,( D3 x D3), 
F,(F;(D, x D3) j, and in general Fy( Q x D3) E S, (n E 0 j. Let S, be the set of 
those relations, which are definable in (& S, , E). Then certainly U A 
n{ R: R E S, , F,(R) C_ R} has to be in S2. One can see that U consists of the elements 
of R,, and of all pairs (a, h), where a B domain( R,J and b E B or 6 is of the form 
Ca( 6, , b), or h( h( b, , b,), h( b,, h,)), etc., where all bi E B. If S3 denotes the set of 
those relations which are definable in (D, S?, E), then R,, E S3, because R,, is - _ 3 
definable as the set of all (a, b) E U, such that U is functional on a. Now S = 
can be obtained by continuing this process (i.e. S,, is the set of relations definable 
in (Q, SP, E) if 5y is a successor ordinal of the form /3 + 1, S,, k lJ{ SP: p < a> if cy 
is a limit ordinal, ,,~U{S,,: (Y -=c wl}, since S,,,, = SW,+,), but the point is, 
howe--, that R,\, c_ , and since R,, is the least fixed point of Ft in P( D3 x &), 
R,v, must be the least fixed point of Ft in Ju = ( ZJ3, So, E). In other words, the meaning 
7r 4 0; 77 in 4 = (&, &, E) is just the standard one. 
However, for arbitrary S, there is quite little one can say about &‘, since the least 
fixed point of F, in S depends very much on S itself. For example, one can easily 
imagine an S for which &’ is R,, u Rk, where a is an arbitrary element not in the 
domain of R,, and b is an arbitrary node of I3 and R: is defined as follows: 
(a, b)E R!‘,, and whenever (a’, b’)~ Rt and b’= h(c, d), (g,a’, c) and (gyf, d? are 
as well in Ri; nothing else is in R:. On the other hand, if both, say R, = R,, u Rf, 
and R1?= R,s, u Ri’ (b # b’), are in S, then &’ = R,, again, since R,, = R, r\ I& E S. 
rst order dynamic logic recursive programs: co p~e~e~e$s theorem 
After having defined the syntax and the semantics of the programming language 
Pd for every given type d, we are now ready to define the first order language DLT’ 
of type ds for reasoning about the programs in Pd. The logic DL”‘= {DLT’: d a 
l-sorted type} will turn out to be the absolute version of the standard logic or 
denotational semantics of recursive programs (cf. Introduction) we were searching 
for. The main result of this section (and in fact of the paper) is the (strong) 
completenets of DL”‘: for every type d there is a (decidable) proof concept I--“~ 
for the language DLF’, such that for every set 7% of formulas of DL’,” and for 
every formula cp of D ,rFC, Tbzkcp iff 7?rkrechp. 
(the Language DLY’). Let d be an arbi 
is defined to be the s 
conditions: 
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(1) Fd,s c DFF’. (Remember that FdF is the set of all first order formulas of type 
A, see Definition 2.5(i).) 
(2) For every program 7r E Pd and every formula rl/ E DF:,“, q (T, $) E DF;“, 
(3) For any formulas cp, # E WF;” and any variable z E X u Y, 
{-IV, (p A $), 5 DF;". 
This defines the set DFT’ of dynamic formulas of type d. 
(ii) Now we define the meaning of the dynamic formulas in the 2-sorted models 
A E Md,,( CoEx). Let therefore Ju = (Q, S, E) be such a model and let e, : X + D 
and e2 : Y + S be evaluations of the variables of sort d and s, respectively into A. 
We are going to define A=q[ e, , eJ for all 50 E DFY’. 
(1) If cp E Fds, then l =cp[e,, e2] is already defined (see Definition 2.5(iii)). 
(2) Let 7~ = V(X) E & and + E DFF’ and assume that AU=$[ I,, lJ has already 
been defined for arbitrary evaluations I, and I? of the variables into A%. Then 
.M==O(~, $)[e,, e,] iff for every a E D, (e,(x), a) E m(x).” implies JZh,b[e,(a/x), e2], 
where the variant e,(a/x) of e, is defined as usually: for every x’ E X, 
e,(a Jxl(x’) = 
(e,(x’) ifx # x’, 
I 
a 
otherwise. 
Notice that the above definition is the usual definition of the partial correctness of 
r in Al with respect to the output condition qk 
(3) Let q, $ E OFF’ and z E X u Y Then Al=lcp[e,, e2], AO=(cp A $)[e,, elj and 
A&(3ztp)[e,, eJ are defined the usual way. 
(4) For any <p E DFT’, Ail=cp iff .Ml=cp[e,, e,3 for all evaluations e1 and e, of sort 
d and _s, respectively into A!. 
(iii) The language DLL;’ of type d of the first order dynamic logic for recursive 
programs is defined as DLF’= (DF?‘, Mdd.J CoEx), I=), where i= is defined in (ii) 
above. 
tation. (i) We will use the derived connectives V, +, e, A, 0 in the usual, 
way (e.g. O( n, +) abbreviates lCl( q +)). 
(ii) The partial correctness assertion {(p}n{ ~5) becomes here the formula <p + 
UT, #). 
(iii) Let 771 c DF;“, <p E DF;” and A E Md,,( CoEx). We will use the notations 
.M=7” and 7%I=cp in the usual way, e.g. 771l=(p means that for every model 
e will now prepare our 
remainder of this section le 
efinit’o- I II Z(iii) the caassica 
teness of DL:;“. Throu 
1 -sorted type. First r 
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efiaition (proof concept, see [46]). Let L = (F, M, I=) be a language. By a proof 
concept for L we understand a relation t-c P(F) x F together with a set Pr c 
P,(F) x F* x F, such that for every set T/r c F and every ~0 E F, 7%~(p iff (H, w, cp) E 
Pr for some finite set M c 7% and for somei w E F*. The proof concept (I-, Pr) is 
decidable iff the set Pr is decidable (in P,(F) x F* x F, where PW( F) denotes the 
set of all finite subsets of F). Sometimes we will say “I- is decidable”, rather than 
“(I-, Pr> is a decidable proof concept”. 
5.4. Notation (the classical proof concept for LdJ. (i) We will denote by (I-, Prc) the 
classical proof concept of Ld, (cf. [46, IO. 14- 10.271). In other words Prc k 
{(H, w, cp): H C_ Flls is finite, cp E F& and w is a classical first order proof of q from 
N in the sense of [46,10.24]}. We also recall that (F, Prc) is a decidable, sound and 
complete proof concept for Ld.\, i.e. Prc is decidable and for any 7% c Fd, and 
50 E F& Thl=cp iff 7%1--cp. 
(ii) The proof concept (t-, Prc) immediately provides a decidable, sound and 
comp&e proof concept for our framework language FLd,. Namely, in FLd,s it is 
true that for every 7% c_ Fljs and cp E Fds, 771hp iff (7% u CoExjt-cp. We denote this 
proof cone ept for FLd, by (I-, PrCoEx), where PrCoEx A ((H, w, cp): H C_ Fds is finite, 
<p E F(,,% and w is a classical first order praof of p from H u CoEx}. 
TG prove the completeness of DL;“, we will pretty much follow the idea of the 
proof of Theorem 2 of [8]. The idea is to translate the language DL:,” to the complete 
(and compact) framework language FLd, = (F(,,., Md& CoEx), I=) by a total compu- 
table function @ : !‘lFT’--) Fd, in such a way, that for every p E OF::’ and every 
.A% E Md,,s(CoEx), (*) A+((P f-) O(q)). Then, for any ‘771 E DF’,” and q E DF;“, we 
wili be able to define a FeC -proof of q from ?Ir as a sequence (H, (O(H), w, O(q)), cp) 
where H c_ ‘Fil is I l-mite subset of DF;” and (O(H), w, O(q)) E PrCoEx, i.e. is a 
classical first order proor‘of O(q) from 8(H) u CoEx. Since 0 is a total computable 
function, Fret will be decidable, moreover, using the completeness of FLd, and 
property (*) of 0, we will have then proved the completeness theorem for DL’,“. 
emaak. The proof concept FeC for DL’,” just described above is obviously 
not going to be a Hilbert style inference system. But following the example of [59], 
it would not be difficult to give a Hilbert style inference system. In this first version 
of the paper however, our goal is to convey the NLP-approach described in the 
Introduction and not so much the esthetics. 
o&ion (the tranclation function 0 : B)Fcl ret + F,[, ). There is a total computable 
: DF;” + Ftt., such that condition (*) below holds. 
(*) For puery q E DF;” dds( CoEx), All=(~p ++ @(so jj. 
efine 0 recursively. 
(I) Let @E F,,,. hen @(y,Pw 
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(2) Let p, #E DFFc and assume that O(q j and O(+) have already been defined 
and satisfy condition (*). 
(i) Let n = n(x) E Pd be an arbitrary (recursive) program of type d. First we want 
to define O(O( r, 9)). For this however, we need Qe following lemma. 
5.7. Lemma. The meaning of any program TT E Pd in any model .A of FLd, is deJina&le 
in Fds, i.e. for any program T e P& there is a formula cp,( x, , x2) E Fds, such that for 
every Ju = (Q, S, E)E Md& CoEx) and aq. a, b E D, AI=cpJa, b] [ff (a, 6) E T.“. 
roof of Lemma 5.7, Lzt A% = (Q, S, E)E Md&CoEx) and rr = r(x), defined by 
p(x):= T(X), b e arbitrary. Recall from Lemma 3.4, that F, (defined as F,(R) = 
a.“( p/ R) for every R E S) is definable in Fd\, i.e. there is a formula ~Jx, x’, y) E Fd.,, 
such that for every R E S and a, b E D, AI= yJ’a, b, R] iff (a, b) E F_(R). Tke formula 
defining &’ is now defined as 
%r(x, x2) A ~yWx~x’((x, x’) E y* %(x, x’, 4’)) + (x, , x4 E y]* 
(Intuitively, cp,( x I, ~2) says that (.a-, , x2) is an element of every fixed point of F, in 
S.) Since M==Co, 
in other words there is an R E S, such that for any a, b E D, (a, b) E R iff A=cp,[a, b]. 
We claim that R = W” ( = psFT, i.e. the least fixed point of F, in S). Obviously, if 
(a, b) E R, then by AU==cp,[a, b], (a, b) is an element of every fixed point of FT in 
S, so in particular of &‘, too. Conversely, if (a, 6) E w”, then, &’ being the 
intersection of all R’ E S which satisfy FJ R’) c R’ (see the proof of Theorem 3.3), 
(a, b) is an element of every fixed point of F, in S, so M=cp,[ a, b] and (a, b) E R. Cl 
reposition 5.6 (conclusion). Returning to the proof of Proposition 5.6, we 
define now O(Cl(rr, +)). 
@(O(~, 9)) A% VX’(%(X, x’) + %Nx’lx)), 
where x’ does not occur in O( #) and O(+)( x x is obtained by replacing every ‘/ ) 
free occurrence of x in O( (I/) by x’. We will next prove Al=(Cl( n, (L) * O(O(n; e))). 
Let therefore e, : X + D and e2: Y -+ S be arbitrary evaluations of the variables of 
sort _d and _s, respectively into A and assume that AKl( rr, $)[ e, , ez]. By Definition 
S.I(ii)(2), this is equivalent to the following: for every a E D, if (e,(x), 4) E r(x).“, 
then JUt=+[e,(a/x), e,l. By Lemma 5.7 and the induction hypothesis for +, 
this is equivalent to the following: for every a E D, if AO=cp,~ z,(x), a], then 
M=@($)[e,(a/x), e,], which, in its turn, is equivalent to 
l ~~(~x’(cp,(x, x’) + @(S)(x’lxi))[e,, ed, 
i.e. to .M== @( q ( n, @))[ e, , e2]. 
($), O(T,O)&@(~) and 
zO(cp) are obvious an 
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5. ( The proqf concept of DL:,“). By a t-“‘-proof of q E DFTC from 
c DFT’ a sequence (H, w, O( cp)), such that c 771 
(O(H), w, cp)) E i.e. a classical proof O(p) from u CoFx. 
more detail: Prec A (O(W), W, cp)), <p):H DF;” finite, E DF:;‘, 
(O(H), w, O(cp))~ PrCoEx). For any 7% c OFF’ and cp E DF’,“, we &rine i%t--“‘p 
iff there is a H c 771 and v E I?,( F,,) x F$s x F&, such that (H, v, cp) E Prec. Notice 
that (I--‘~‘, Prec) is a proof concept in the sense of Definition 5.3 (except for the fact 
that v =(O(H), IV, O( t,u)) E PJ F,,) x Ffr x F&, but P,( Fd.J x Fs, x Fd,$ can easily be 
identified with F:;,). 
5.9. Proposition. t- “’ is a decidable proof concept. 
roof. Using the facts that OFF’ and (t-, PvCoEx) are decidable and that @ is 
computable, the reader can easily complete the proof. Cl 
Now we are ready to prove our main result. 
5.10. Theorem (strong completeness of DL’,“). (i) 7?re proqf concept (t-“‘, Prec) is 
a (decidable) sound and complete proof systemSfor DL:,“, i.e. for any 7% E DF:,” and 
(PE DF,“, 7Wcp iff 77Geccp. 
(ii) l7re language DLTc is compact. 
. (i) Assume 771l=y~ in DLY’. By Proposition 5.6, this is equivalent to 
)c=r@(cp) in &s, which, by the soundness and completeness of (t-, PrCoE_x), 
is equivalent to @( 771)~O(q), i.e. to the fact that there is a classical first order 
proof (K, w, @(cp)) E Prc of O( cp) from O( 771) u CoEx. The latter is equivalent to 
saying that there i.s a t-ret-proof (H, (O(H), W, O( cp)), cp) E Prec of cp from 771, where 
K n O( 7%) = o(H) (K being a finite subset of O( 771) u CoEx). This proves that 
771l=(p in DL’,” i 
(ii) The compactness of DL T’ follows immediately from the compactness of FLtl,, 
using that 771I=q in DL’,” iff O( 771)l=O(cp) in FL,,, by Proposition 5.6. Cl 
6. iscussion and the relation to other logics of 
Referring to the Introduction, let us recall that one of the most important objectives 
of the NLP-approach is to provide adequate background or frame logics for the 
comparative study of program verification methods for given programming 
languages. As a successful product of the NE -approach let us look, for cxampk 
at Nonstandard Qynamic Logic (NDL). N f the many possible absolute 
versions (see e.g. [ 16,40, 631) of is a 3-sorted first order logic 
of programs with a decidable, complete proof conce 
or 511, the merit of the completeness of N 
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the fact that it provides enough (standard and nonstandard) models to be able to 
accommodate the models (I.e. semantics) for a great number of existing as well as 
new (interesting) program verification methods. To illuminate what we just said, 
let us evoke one of the tirsL aesults of NDL. The partial correctness of a while-program 
is Floyd-Hoare-provable iff it is partially correct in exactly those models of NDL 
which satisfy induction on time, i.e. computational induction, restricted to formulas 
with no quantified variables of sort time. More generally, a typical result of NQL 
would read like this. 
P*) The property P of program 7r is provable by the (verification) method 
M iR n has property P in all models of NDL satisfying the (decidable!) 
set of axioms Ax,,, 
far 
more consequence of is that provides a for comparing 
powers of methods M proving property of programs: the 
power a method with that another method, iLI’, boils in view 
(**), to Ax M AxhI- within i.e. within and the logic. 
( one would to compare powers of methods is long story, _ 
which could and may oe should be told in a separate paper, but a temporary answer 
would be the following: one would like to know the “price” of each method, e.g. 
it follows from the results mentioned above, that, although weaker than BurstaKs 
verification method, Floyd’s method is “cheaper”, because it requires only a restric- 
ted type of computational induction, while Burstall’s method requires full induction. 
So, depending on the kind of programs we want to prove correct, we can decide 
on the “price” we have or do not have to pay.) What is the relation of all this to 
the rtsults of the present paper? Let us recall that p>L”’ is an abso!ute version of 
standard denotational semantics of recursive program, the same way NDL is an 
absolute version of DL. Its proof concept tJrec provides a (syntactic) method to 
prove properties of recursive programs n. If v happens to be equivalent to a 
while-program, then obviously the question arises how I---_‘~ relates to the other 
verification methods. To answer this, we need to characterize Vc in NDL. As a 
result, we obtain the following instance of (**): for every recursive program n of 
type 4 equivalent to a w-hile-program r’ of type d, the partial correctness of n with 
respect to a formula $ E F,, (i.e. q l( rr, $)) is t-“‘-provable in DL:;” iff n’ is partially 
correct with respect to $ in all models of NDL satisfying the set DAX of axioms 
of NQL (defined and discussed in [58, 59, 62, 651 or in [66]). So with respect to 
partial correctness (and in fact it is interesting to note that wit;i respl?ct to total 
correctness, too) the proof concept VrcC is equivalent to the proof concept 
AXI- N”L (i.e. the proof concept of NDL endowed with DAX as logical axioms). 
It is not relevant for us here to at exactly DAX is, but it is relevant that 
X is more powerful than an known partial correctness methods (like 
r” 3 etail, if q ( 7p’, +) is 
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Pnueli’s method, it is provable by I-~*‘~, i.e. q l( n; J/) is provable by 
I- re’ in DL::‘. But there are programs r in P d, equivalent to while-programs r’, 
whose partial correctness with respect to some $ E F‘, is provable in DL,/ (i.e. 
q l( &, $) is provable by N”L), but q l( r’, #) is not provable by any of the 
above rTentioned methods. (For an example for such a z-a theorem prover-see 
[Ml.) The situation is very similar concerning total correctness: Vet (i.e. DAX I--~“~) 
is strictly stronger than, say, anna-Cooper’s Intermittent Assertions Method (see 
e.g. [S&62]). As Example 3 of Section 4 shows, there are recursive programs, which 
are not equivalent to any while-program. DE”’ is a new logic to reason abou 
(genuinely) recursive programs. For example, if d is the I-sorted type of Example 
3 in Section 4, and & is the data type or model of type d therein, let us denote by 
7% the theory of QJ, i.e. 771 = 771( &) is the set of all first order formulas of type 
d true in &. Let @ E F,, be the following first order formula of type d: $2 
3x,3x,(x = 11(x,, x1)). Let n be the recursive program of Example 3. Recall that in 
&, n is not equivalent to any while-program. It is easy to see that in every model 
,& = ( 0, S, E ) E Md,,,( CoEx ) satisfying 7%, .ttizZ •(~, ti). By Theorem 5.10 then, 
7% t-Yl( ?rJ, I,!?). Similarly, one can prove that 
~~~rec13x,(x =.f(x,) + Oh 3x,3xJx,3xLJx = h(h(x,, x2), h(x,, x,)))]. 
Exactly like in the case of NDL, the main reason for constructing the complete 
logic DL”’ of recursive programs is to provide the ground for a compurative study 
qf program ver$cation methods jlor recursive programs. This defines and formulates 
the task of the present paper, namely to prepare and make it possible to start this 
comparative study, It is the task of follow-up papers to take those verification 
methods M of the literature which are designed for proving properties of recursive 
programs and, following perhaps the techniques of Sain [61,64], represent them in 
DL”’ (i.e. prove results analogous to instances of (**)) and then compare their 
reasoning powers Nithin DL”‘. 
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